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FEDERAL TORTS CLAIMS ACT: SUPREME COURT
ADOPTS STATE'S CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES
THE FEDERAL ToRTs CLAIMS AcT1 provides that the United States
is liable in tort as would be a private individual "in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."' This lan-
guage permits various interpretations concerning which law is appli-
cable where negligence in one jurisdiction leads to injury in another.
The Supreme Court resolved this problem of interpretation in the
recent case of Richards v. United States.3
Suit was brought in Oklahoma alleging that negligence on the part
of the United States in Oklahoma had led to the death of plaintiff's
husband in an airplane crash in Missouri.4 The district court dismissed
the action for failure to state a daim5 because the Oklahoma conflict-
of-laws rule required application of Missouri Law under which maxi-
mum recovery had already been received.6 A divided Court of Appeals
affirmed,' the dissent contending that only the "internal" law of Okla-
homa, permitting unlimited recovery, should apply. The Supreme
2 6o Stat. 842 (1946), codified in scattered sections of title 28 of the United States
Code.
2 8 U.S.C. 13 46(b) ('959).
'369 U.S. i (x962).
'The allegation was that the United States, acting through the Civil Aeronautics
Administration, had negligently failed to prohibit certain repair practices in an Okla-
homa airline overhaul depot. Record, p. 4.
Although the question was not reached in this litigation, in another proceeding
arising out of the same crash it was found that actionable negligence on the part of
the United States was not shown. Lee v. United States, Civ. No. 3358 (N.D. Tex.
1957), cited in Brief for Appellee pp. 3-4 note 6, Richards v. United States, 285 F.2d
521 (loth Cir. 196o).
"The district court decision is unreported. After a pre-trial hearing, a two-part
conclusion of law was made by the court. First, it was held that the Oklahoma
Wrongful Death Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 §§ 1053, 1054 (z95i), was inapplicable
because it had no extra-territorial effect. See, e.g., Gochenour v. St. Louis San Fran-
cisco Ry., '2o Okla. 594, 239 P.2d 769 (1952). Thus, the only basis for suit
was under Oklahoma's general law, applying its conflict-of-laws rules. Second, apply-
ing those rules, the suit was determined by reference to the Missouri Wrongful Death
Statute, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 537.070.100 (x959).
*Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.090 (1949). This amounted to $x5,ooo which had been
paid to some of the plaintiffs and tendered to the rest by payment into the court's regis-
try. These payments were made by American Airlines, a third party defendant here.
The Missouri statutes were subsequently amended to allow maximum recovery of
$25,000. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537-O9o (1959)"
'Richards v. United States, 285 F.zd 521 (ioth Cir. 596o).
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Court unanimously affirmed, holding that the "law" of the place of the
act or omission referred to the "whole" law, induding choice-of-law
rules, of the place where the "acts of negligence took place." 8
Prior to the Richards decision, the lower federal courts had formu-
lated three approaches in determining the law applicable in Torts Claims
Act cases involving more than one jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit
had applied the law of the place where the negligence produced injuryY
This construction could be based upon the theory that the act was meant
to embody the traditional choice-of-law rule looking directly to the place
of the injury,'0 or upon the conceptualistic difficulty of separating the
negligent act or omission from the resultant injury."1 The District of
Columbia Circuit had decided that the language of the act required
application of the internal law of the place where the negligent act or
omission occurred."2 The Tenth Circuit holding in the instant case,
presenting the third alternative, applied the "whole" law of the place
of the act or omission, including its conflict-of-laws rules.18
The Supreme Court summarily rejected application of the law of
the place where the negligence produced injury as not comporting with
the ordinary meaning of the statutory language. In considering the
other two possibilities, both of which apparently come within the pur-
view of the statutory phrase "law of the place," the Court recognized
that congressional intent was non-existent concerning choice of law where
the negligent act or omission occurred in one state and the injury in
8 369 U.S. at so.
Hess v. United States, 259 F.2d 285 ( 9 th Cir. x958), vacated on other grounds,
361 U.s. 314 (r96o) ; United States v. Marshall, 230 F.2d 183 (9 th Cir. 1956); Air
Transport Associates v. United States, 221 F.2d 467 (9 th Cir. x955). This approach
was also taken by the unusual dissenting opinion in Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust
Co., 221 F.2d 6z (D.C. Cir. 1955).
The Hess case suggests a fourth possible alternative to the three approaches examined
in the text, that the "whole law," including choice-of-laws rules, of the place of the
injury be applied.
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS Op LAW § 377 (1934).
"'This result seems inherent in the use of such language as: "the negligence existed
but was then inoperative." United States v. Marshall, 230 F.zd 183 at s87 (9 th Cir.
1956).
Compare Lacey v. L.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 9x6 (D. Mass. t9st)
where similar language in the Death on the High Seas Act was construed in this same
manner.
,
3 Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1gss). This
approach was also followed by the dissenting judge in the Tenth Circuit opinion in
the instant case. See also Cook v. United States, 274 F.zd 689 (2d Cir. x96o).
"Richards v. United States, z85 F.zd 521, 524 (oth Cir. x96o). This same
approach seems indicated in Landon v. United States, 197 F.2d 1a8 (2d Cir. t9S2).
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another.1 However, in determining the scope of the language, the
Court held that application of the "whole" law of the place of the act or
omission would better effectuate the congressional policy of equating
the liability of the United States with that of a "private person under
like circumstances." 5 That application of only the internal law is
inadequate to meet this policy becomes apparent by noting that had the
tort-feasor been a private individual, traditional conflict-of-laws rules
would dictate a different result by applying the law of the place of
injury. 6
The Court also pointed out that the use of the "whole" law would
provide a degree of flexibility in the area. Traditionally, choice of law
in cases involving negligent conduct in one state leading to injury in
another has been governed by a rigid rule requiring application of the
law or the place of the injury.'7  Despite constitutional overtones,' 8
dissatisfaction with inequities resulting from the rule's mechanical appli-
cation have led to a call for a more discriminating analysis of the policies
and interest of the states involved. 9 Consequently, a relaxation of the
"'See Goodrich, Yielding Place to New: Rest Versus Motion in the Conflict of
Laws, 5o COLUM. L. REV. 881, 894-95 (195o). See generally 45 IOWA L. REv. iz5 at
xz6 (1959).
"The quoted language comes from the Senate hearings on the act. S. Rep. No.
1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1946).
"The dissenting opinion of Judge Magruder in Cook v. United States, 274 F.zd
689, 692 (2d Cir. 196o), strikingly illustrates this aspect of the problem. It should
be noted, however, that the liability of the United States and an individual tort-feasor
are not congruent, even under the statute. See 68 HARv. L. REv. 1455, 1456 (1955).
The Court in the Richards case points out a similar problem arising because of the
two possible venues under the statute. 369 U.S. at 12 n.25. If suit were brought at
plaintiff's residence, to determine the liability of an individual the court would look
directly to the law of the place of injury, assuming use of classical choice-of-law rules,
but under this decision the liability of the United States is determined by reference to
the law of what may possibly be a different state, i.e. that of the place of negligence,
which may or may not also look to the law of the place of injury.
" An extensive analysis and listing of cases following this rule is found in Annot.,
77 A.L.R.zd x66, 1273-86 (196i).
"S 1[1]t is established as the law of this court that when a person recovers in one
jurisdiction for a tort committed in another he does so on the ground of an obligation
incurred at the place of the tort . . . and that is not only the ground but the measure
of the maximum recovery." Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547
(1914) (Holmes, J.). It should be noted, however, that both the negligent act or
omission and the injury in that case occurred in the same jurisdiction.
"' See, e.g., CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICr Op LAws: ch.
1 (194z) i Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HARV. L. REV. 82z (1950) i
Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judi-
cial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9 (1958).
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strict regimen engendered by the traditional approach has been achieved
in some jurisdictions.20 The flexibility envisioned by the Court in the
instant case made it necessary to recognize this relaxation. In a
reiterated dictum highly informative of the Court's present attitude
toward the constitutional problems presented by such cases, it was indi-
cated that where more than one state has an apparent basis for having
its law applied, the forum may constitutionally analyze those bases in
determining which represents an interest sufficient for application of a
particular state's law.21 It seems apparent, however, that using the
"whole" law will permit flexibility only to the extent allowed by
conflict-of-laws rules of the state whose law is to be applied.
Although the principal question in the Richards case involves inter-
pretation of a federal statute, that statute only operates within the con-
fines of the state laws. Thus, in undertaking an interest analysis, it is
the policies of the states and their interests in enforcing those policies,
as represented by their laws, that should be examined. The facts of
the instant case present an informative situation for such analysis. Re-
covery under wrongful death statutes represents a jurisdiction's attempt
to preserve to the decedent's dependants an economic position approxi-
mating that existing prior to the death.2 Limitations on the amount
of such recoveries indicate a balancing of the dependants' needs against
the danger of an excessive verdict injurious to local economic interests.
No policy or interest appears present in the facts of this case to justify
application of the Missouri protective policy except the adventitious
fact that the airplane happened to crash there." Thus it would seem
so Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Schmidt v. Driscoll
Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 8± N.W.2d 365 (1957); Haumschild v. Continental Cas.
Co., 7 Wis. zd 130, 95 N.W.zd 814 (959). This departure has been strongly advo-
cated in a series of articles by Professor Currie. These articles are listed and exten-
sively criticized in Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to
Professor Currie, 27 U. Cmr. L. REv. 463 (i96o).
The same result has been reached on the superficial basis of terming limitations of
liability to be procedural rather than substantive. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
9 N.Y.zd 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.zd 133 (x96z). A favorable analysis of
that decision in terms of the interests involved is found in 74 HARV. L. REv. 1652
(196i).
"1 This reasoning seems to compare favorably with the position taken by Professor
Currie. See especially, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental In-
terests and the Judicial Function, 26 Cir. L. Ra'. 9 (1958) and, The Constitution
and the "Transitory" Cause of Action (pts. 1-z), 73 HARv. L. REV. 36, 268 (1959).
22 "Damages awarded to widows and orphans under [Lord Campbell's Act] are
awarded to compensate dependants of the deceased for the loss of financial support
which they would have enjoyed but for the death." io8 L.J. 741 (1958).
10 Compare Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.s. 354 (1959):
[Vol. x96z: 463
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that the law of the forum should have been applied in the instant case."
The Richards decision, by adopting the state conflict-of-laws rules
in actions under the Torts Claims Act unfortunately but unavoidably25
will usually require the lower federal courts to follow blindly rules
which frequently do not adequately consider the interests of the states
involved. However, by recognizing in dictum the governmental in-
terest analysis, the decision may well bring that development into
greater prominence. But because the point of Oklahoma law before the
Court was at least less than pellucid,26 the Supreme Court could have
greatly enhanced the stature of the approach by applying it in this case.
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit's holding that it was "bound" to apply
the Missouri limitation was not based upon an interpretation of Okla-
homa law but rather upon decisions involving a conflict between the laws
of Colorado and Wyoming 2 It is to be hoped that in deciding future
cases under the act, where state choice-of-law rules permit, the lower
federal courts will not base decisions upon a state's having a fortuitous
"contact" with the case, but rather upon a thorough analysis of the
pertinent policies to determine if the "contact" represents a valid in-
terest of the state upon which application of that particular law should
be predicated.
"The amount and type of recovery which a foreign seaman may receive from his
foreign employer while sailing on a foreign ship should not depend on the wholly
fortuitous circumstance of the place of injury." Id. at 384. (Emphasis added.)
"A complete interest analysis requires giving the United States as defendant the
characteristics of residence of a particular jurisdiction to determine which policies are
pertinent. The possibilities are the state of the injury, the forum state, cf. Phillips
Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School Dist., 361 U.S. 376 (196o), or the District
of Columbia, cf. Fisher v. Fisher, 25o N.Y. 313, 165 N.E. 46o (x929). The discus-
sion in the text indicates there is no strong connection to the place of the injury. In
either of the remaining jurisdictions limitless recovery would be available. OKLA. STAT.
tit. 12 §§ 1053, 1054 (i95i) i D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1201 to 1203 (1961).
"'As an original proposition, it would seem that allowing the federal courts to
develop an independent body of law in the tort field would have been a desirable fea-
ture of the Torts Claims Act, and would have done away with problems of this nature.
Compare Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (-957).
" The Supreme Court recognized that the Oklahoma conflicts-of-law rule on this
particular point was drawn from dicta. 369 U.S. at 16 n.35.
Although this was accepted by plaintiffs, it is arguable that the Oklahoma courts
might term the limitation procedural. Cf. Edison v. Lewis 325 P.zd 955 (Okla.
x958); compare Kilberg v. Northeast Airline, Inc., 9 N.Y.zd 34, N.E.2d 526, 211
N.Y.S.zd 133 (x961).
"Burlington Transp. Co. v. Stoltz, 191 F.2d 915 (ioth Cir. g95z) ; Stoltz v.
Burlington Transp. Co., 178 F.2d 514 (ioth Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 929
(1950).
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